Remodelling Maritime Finance in India

Introduction

India’s Maritime Amrit Kaal Vision 2047 charts an ambitious investment roadmap of INR 80 lakh crore to modernise shipbuilding, ports, and shipping infrastructure by 2047.^[1] Along with this, India also wants to ramp up its shipbuilding capacity from 0.072 million gross tonnes (GT) per year to 0.33 million GT by 2030 and 11.31 million GT by 2047.^[2] This growth trajectory is essential for it to become one of the top five shipbuilding countries in the world and lessen its dependency on foreign shipyards.

India’s maritime financing costs, however, remain a primary obstacle to this goal. Domestic maritime financing interest rates are currently between 9 and 10 percent, representing a 300 to 500 basis point premium over the rates of 4 to 8 percent in top maritime economies.^[3] This finance deficit makes Indian maritime projects much less viable than their international counterparts, limiting fleet modernisation and shipyard development.

India’s ageing fleet is indicative of this institutional limitation. The country has a fleet of 1,552 ships with a combined gross tonnage of 13.65 million as of November 2024.^[4] However, the average age of a vessel has risen to 22 years, and 42 percent of ships are now older than 20 years.^[5] India’s ability to compete in international maritime trade as well as in domestic coastal shipping is harmed by this decline.

This trend is not incidental. Indian shipowners can acquire second-hand vessels at cheaper rates from other established maritime markets, especially Greece and Japan.^[6] The preference to do so instead of commissioning new builds from local shipyards reflects two compounding factors: the increased unit cost of construction at Indian yards in comparison to international competitors and the lack of competitively priced long-term financing mechanism for new vessel orders. Over time, this has formed a self-reinforcing pattern. Low domestic order volumes mean that Indian shipyards cannot enjoy the benefits of economies of scale and the technical depth required to cut build costs, which in turn makes domestic procurement less attractive to Indian shipowners.

These high costs are characterised by structural constraints in the Indian financial apparatus, as opposed to financial scarcity. In spite of institutional efforts, like the INR 25,000-crore Maritime Development Fund and the establishment of the Sagarmala Finance Corporation Limited (SMFCL), cost parity to international standards is still an issue.^[7]

The Indian government has taken steps to mitigate this gap. In September 2025, a shipbuilding package worth INR 69,725 crore—the single-biggest government commitment to the maritime sector in Indian history—was approved by the Cabinet. It comprises a revamped Shipbuilding Financial Assistance Policy (SBFAS) of INR 24,736 crore; a new Shipbuilding Development Scheme of INR 19,989 crore, to support the expansion of brownfield and greenfield shipyard capacity towards 4.5 million GT annually; and the Maritime Development Fund of INR 25,000 crore.^[8]

Fiscal support alone, however, is not going to solve the cost disadvantage. Global experience consistently shows that unless reforms are made in the institutions responsible for lending, risk assessment, and capital deployment, the cost of borrowing will remain high no matter the public funds made available. Bringing India’s maritime financing costs at par with global rates will, therefore, need structural institutional reform in addition to fiscal commitment.

This brief explores the possible institutional interventions, including guarantee mechanisms, development banking, and freight taxation, needed to reduce maritime financing costs in India to a globally competitive level.

Contextualising India’s Maritime Finance Deficit

India’s maritime finance challenges did not arise in isolation. They are compounded by a set of broader structural constraints. The first is the lack of a uniform enabling policy framework. Successive government declarations, starting from the Maritime Agenda 2010–2020 to Maritime India Vision 2030, have set targets for the growth of the Indian fleet and local shipbuilding capability, which have not been achieved.^[9] Policy solutions have often been reactive rather than proactive, dealing with issues once they are deeply ingrained instead of preventing them. The strategic importance of the sector for national trade, energy security, and defence, areas that would normally require government assistance, have not always been reflected in government policy priorities. There has been a long delay in granting infrastructure status to the maritime sector. The sector’s inclusion in the Harmonised Master List of Infrastructure is a step in the right direction, but the delay has had long-term implications for borrowing costs and investor confidence.^[10]

The second set of constraints has to do with the productive capacity of the sector itself. India has the sixteenth-highest output in shipbuilding worldwide and less than 1 percent of the global commercial shipbuilding market.^[11] A shortage of shipyard capacity coupled with an inability to compete on cost and dimension with established producers in China, South Korea, and Japan has suppressed the domestic order volumes that would create the commercial activity necessary to attract private financing.^[12] Geopolitical developments, such as the Houthi attacks on Red Sea trade routes and the consolidation by China of over 50 percent of global shipbuilding output,^[13] have added external pressures, which Indian yards and ship operators are ill-placed to absorb.

Maritime finance is influenced by all these conditions, with the cyclical nature of shipping earnings meaning that lenders have been even more cautious. The institutional reforms suggested in this brief must be understood in this larger context.

Why India’s Maritime Finance Costs Remain High

Limited Sector Expertise: Most Indian banks lack dedicated shipping desks with specialised professionals who can analyse vessel economics, hull value depreciation, charter contract structures, or residual asset values.^[14] Banks also do not understand shipping cycles. In the absence of such technical capability, they depend on conservative risk pricing and old-fashioned corporate lending models that do not cover the unique cash flows and collateral characteristics of maritime assets.

Asset–Liability Mismatch: The average tenure of bank lending in Indian banks is at an all-time high of almost nine years, with the average tenure of deposit at a low of two and a half years.^[15] This discrepancy reflects strongly in marine funding, as the economic life of marine vessels is 15–20 years. Indian commercial banks, however, impose repayment rates under these existing liability structures, which increases the loan servicing rates to excessive levels and compels borrowers to pay a higher effective cost.

Weak Secondary Markets: India does not have good secondary trading infrastructure in vessels as compared to its well-established maritime finance counterparts, where lenders can forecast recovery of collateral scenarios through the sale and purchase market of ships.^[16] The absence of market-based price discovery processes compels banks to make increased assumptions in terms of default losses, and increase haircuts against vessel collateral.

Volatile Shipping Earnings: Freight rate volatility complicates the lenders’ determination of revenue paths. The lack of specialised maritime credit models among Indian lenders means that they cannot easily tell the difference between cyclical variations in earnings and fundamental credit deterioration in the market. Therefore, due to the high capital requirements in vessels, risk aversion in the industry is widespread.

Regulatory Constraints: India has permitted large vessels to be employed as loan collateral, which is a step in the right direction. But the general regulatory framework has not yet developed enough to incorporate the specialised maritime financing structures that are prevalent in bigger jurisdictions. ^[17] Consequently, maritime credit has been subject to high-risk corporate lending by banks rather than asset-based financing with its special risk mitigation forms.

Global Institutional Models for Maritime Finance

This section analyses three international models of maritime finance from Norway, South Korea, and Brazil. Each has a different institutional approach to managing the structural constraints that limit maritime lending. Norway has a risk-sharing guarantee mechanism that helps minimise the exposure of commercial banks to maritime credit risk.^[18] South Korea uses the framework of a dedicated development bank with a statutory mandate for the maritime sector to channel long-term financing.^[19] Brazil supports maritime development with a freight tax that creates an annual revenue stream independent of the budget cycle.^[20] Other major shipbuilding nations such as Japan, China, and Germany have adopted variations of these approaches.

Each of these models deals with a specific constraint faced by India—lender risk aversion, mismatch between short deposit tenors and the long life of assets, and fiscal dependency. Analysing each in its clearest form can provide a reliable basis for identifying the institutional design most suited to India’s maritime financing ecosystem.

Norway: Risk Sharing through Export Credit Architecture

The Norwegian maritime finance system is globally competitive because of an institutional collaboration between Export Finance Norway (Eksfin)^[21] and the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Export Credits (GIEK).^[22] GIEK issues guarantees that protect up to 90 percent of likely loan defaults.^[23] The 10 percent risk that banks retain is equivalent to their incentives with efficient credit underpricing. The large tail risk that would otherwise deter commercial institutions from lending to GIEK is borne by it, enabling commercial banks to take part in maritime financing without assuming full counterparty risk. This risk-sharing model extends the provision of maritime finance far beyond what lending institutions (individually) would be able to offer. In 2021, GIEK was formally merged into Eksfin, consolidating Norway’s export finance and guarantee functions under a single institutional framework.

Eksfin also offers 12- to 15-year durations for ship financing,^[24] based on the economic lifecycle of maritime assets, thus reducing tenure compression, which forces up effective costs in systems where lenders demand shortened repayment periods. Long-term financing lets debtors extend the debt servicing over the productive years of the vessel and reduces the payment per year, allowing for the formation of economically viable loan arrangements. Further, Eksfin provides fixed-rate loans based on the Commercial Interest Reference Rates (CIRR) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),^[25] leading to a 4–5 percent financing rate equivalent to global standards.

Norway integrates green shipping objectives within this strategic financing framework. As of 2015, the Norwegian state funding agency Enova has invested over NOK1.6 billion in green maritime projects, such as battery-electric ships and related charging infrastructure.^[26] Maritime operators can also make reduced payments to the country’s NOx fund rather than paying nitrogen oxide taxes, with the funds thus obtained directly invested into emission-cutting technologies.

The Norway model thus shows that the strategic use of financing can achieve both environmentally and financially sustainable goals.

South Korea: Specialised Development Banking for Maritime Competitiveness

South Korea’s national maritime financing structure is supported by the Export-Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM), which is a fully state-owned development bank rated AA-.^[27] KEXIM provides full-cycle financing, that is, direct lending up to a maximum of twelve years; export project financing;^[28] financial guarantees; bond guarantees; and structured project financing. Its risk management strategy is built on the foundation of mortgage security, earnings assignments, and pledge over earning accounts. ^[29] In 2022, KEXIM gave out US$1.9 billion worth of loans to Korean shipping firms to acquire 27 vessels, three times higher than the previous year. ^[30]

KEXIM’s institutional niche mandate has allowed it to develop an extensive expertise in the maritime sector that generalist commercial banks cannot follow. The bank can generate complex risk models, which consider the dynamics of shipping cycles, the structuring of charter contracts, and the residual values of vessels. Further, KEXIM’s access to the capital market, enabled by its AA- rating, and its ability to issue debentures (which made up to 85 percent of the total liability of KEXIM at the end of 2024), give it a long-term basis of funds that commercial banks lack.^[31] Such an institutional framework resolves the asset–liability mismatch constraining generalist lenders—KEXIM can borrow long term at favourable rates and lend long term to marine operators without having to compress tenure.

Having a full range of financial products and the ability to structure flexibly, KEXIM shows how a specialised maritime development bank can lower the cost of financing and extend credit opportunities to local shipbuilders and international ship owners.

Brazil: Self-Sustaining Freight Taxation for Maritime Development

The Merchant Marine Fund (FMM) of Brazil is an example of how emerging economies can finance the development of the maritime sector without recourse to emptying fiscal budgets by taxing maritime freight payments.^[32] The FMM provides subsidised funding of up to 90 percent of vessel-building costs,^[33] thus transforming shipping firms into investors into the productive potential of their own industry. In 2024, the FMM Council sanctioned R$30.8 billion (approx. US$5.6 billion) over more than 430 new projects, the highest single-year investment in 12 years.^[34] Most of this amount was spent on new vessel construction and fleet renovation. The annual mobilisation rate shows that self-sustaining income streams can increase without the need to debate the budget annually or compete with other interests of the government.

Brazil integrates strict requirements into FMM financing, whereby new vessels must meet minimum local content requirements of 60 percent in offshore support vessels and 50 percent in big oil tankers and gas carriers.^[35] These conditions guarantee that FMM financing directly focuses on domestic shipbuilding, manufacturing, and engineering industries instead of subsidising vessel acquisition. With access to below-market capital conditional upon compliance with local content, shipping operators not only have access to cheap capital but also subsidise the development of local industrial capacity, so that local operators are better off in the long run. This approach transforms the role of maritime financing beyond a sectoral support policy to an industrial policy, which enhances supply chains and employment.

The freight tax policy in Brazil is effective in that it decouples maritime finance and annual fiscal limits, creates revenue directly proportional to shipping activity, and ties access to financing to quantifiable domestic value creation goals. In contrast to the development bank model, which is based on the credit rating of sovereigns and the strength of capital markets, or in which the procedures used to guarantee the process require a high level of institutional coordination, the FMM in Brazil operates on a self-sustaining income stream. Maritime operators that are partners in FMM via freight taxes realise that the funds subsidise the acquisition of vessels and capacity expansion of their competitors, which gives them a direct economic motivation to participate in the sector. This brings about institutional sustainability: the FMM maintains political support as maritime stakeholders consider it a shared investment tool, and not a governmental instrument of discretion.

Table 1: Select Maritime Financing Models

Source: Author’s own, using various open sources.

Recommendations: A Three-Phase Implementation Road Map

Recent developments indicate that the changes in maritime financing policy made in 2025 are starting to have a tangible impact. In November 2025, Swan Defence and Heavy Industries Limited (SDHI) signed a Letter of Intent with Norwegian shipowner Rederiet Stenersen AS for the construction of six International Maritime Organization (IMO) Type II chemical tankers of 18,000 deadweight tonnage each, worth about US$227 million, with an option for six more.^[36] This is India’s first significant commercial export order for chemical tankers, and it shows rising international confidence in the ability of Indian shipyards.

The deal is directly related to policy action. Chemical tankers were initially excluded from the list of specialised vessels eligible for financial assistance under the revamped SBFAS, which questioned the commercial viability of the contract.^[37] The Ministry of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways responded to this by amending the scheme to cover chemical carriers in January 2026.^[38] This chain of events illustrates that a well-calibrated and responsive set of policies can create a flow of commercial orders in a sector that has long struggled to attract them. It also reveals that even brief lapses in policy coverage have immediate impact on industry. The institutional reforms proposed in the roadmap below are designed to ensure responsive financing mechanisms to support such orders.

Phase 1: Immediate Institutional Foundations

Setting up a Maritime Guarantee Fund: Initial measures must set up a specialised guarantee fund like the GIEK in Norway to cover the loan defaults of approved maritime ventures.^[39] A budgetary allocation of INR 10,000 crore can be tapped at a ratio of 1:6, which translates into a mobilisation of INR 60,000 crore credit in commercial banks. The structure could replicate the Norway model—a guarantee fund absorbs tail risk and individual banks are left with 10 percent exposure, which aligns their credit underwriting goals. The administration of the fund could be undertaken by SMFCL,^[40] the prudential framework that determines approved projects, with the maximum guarantee per transaction issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Commercial banks would collaborate with maritime industry experts and SMFCL staff to generate underwriting requirements. This would reduce effective financing costs of 9–10 percent to 7–8 percent and mobilise INR 15,000 crore of commercial bank maritime lending by Year 1, to increase the availability of credit without requiring wholesale banking infrastructure reform.

Giving the SMFCL Statutory Banking Status: The second suggested intervention addresses the structural constraint of inadequate long-term finance options for maritime assets. The SMFCL has been registered as a Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC) since June 2025;^[41] thus, it cannot mobilise deposits or issue bonds on the scale necessary to finance marine comprehensively. Statutory banking legislation would enable the SMFCL to accept deposits, borrow in the capital markets, and offer complete financial products, such as long-term ship financing, without the capital restrictions that are imposed on NBFCs. By the first year, a strengthened SMFCL could disburse INR 20,000 crore in maritime loans with repayment tenors of 12–15 years, aligned with the operational lifecycle of vessels. Alongside this, establishing credit rating pathways would allow SMFCL to access capital markets and raise funds at competitive rates.

Implementation Sequencing: The two interventions given here can be implemented parallelly with no dependencies. They address the finance dilemma of India in complementary ways, by building a risk-sharing mechanism that quickly brings in commercial banks, and by establishing an institutional-building mechanism that gradually creates a long-run financing capacity that is comprehensive in nature.

Phase 2: Market Development and Revenue Mechanisms

Setting up Maritime Freight Taxation: The second stage would build on the institutional bases established during Phase 1 by creating self-sustaining sources of revenue that do not rely on annual fiscal allocations. Like Brazil’s FMM,^[42] a freight tax on maritime cargo movements can be implemented in India. This could allow for approximate earnings of INR 8,000–10,000 crore annually that can be directly added to the Maritime Development Fund without putting pressure on competing government budget targets. Resistance to freight tax from the shipping industry can be mitigated by making freight tax compliance a direct condition for guaranteed access to concessional financing at rates of 6 to 7 percent, positioing the levy as economically attractive for operators who would otherwise borrow at prevailing market rates of 9 to 10 percent. Incorporating a freight tax, however, requires establishing consensus among the states, as freight taxation influences interstate trade and would demand the verification of international treaties to confirm compliance with marine trade agreements. The Goods and Services Tax Council’s track record in coordinating complex taxation mechanisms across the federal system in India demonstrates the achievability of institutional coordination, though the multi-stakeholder nature of the matter may take 12–18 months to discuss. ^[43]

Piloting Integrated Financing Structures: The SMFCL, the Maritime Guarantee Fund, and the National Bank for Financing Infrastructure and Development must work together to pilot integrated maritime financing in three dimensions: long-term lending (12–15 years), guarantee fund loss-sharing (90 percent loss coverage), and interest subsidies (lower effective rates). The pilot must target 15–20 contracts amounting to INR 40,000 crore in the acquisition of vessels, expansion of shipyard capacity, and development of ports. The success indicators would be the achievement of 6–7 percent blended costs of finance and the establishment of operational precedence that can be escalated during Phase 3.

Phase 3 scalability and institutional confidence in integrated systems to provide maritime financing that is globally competitive directly depend on pilot performance.

Phase 3: Institutional Consolidation and International Integration

Consolidating a Unified Maritime Development Bank: The institutional set-up in the country must incorporate a full marine financing body like the KEXIM in South Korea. The SMFCL can be transformed into a full-fledged maritime development bank having statutory powers, a wide product base, and access to the capital market by parliamentary legislation. This single institution would integrate operations of guarantee funds, policy administration of taxes on goods, as well as direct long-term lending. Sovereign counter-guarantees extended by the Ministry of Finance on bond issues would allow the bank to access capital markets at rates comparable to those currently available to KEXIM under its AA- credit rating. The RBI could formulate a specialised regulatory framework that formally separates maritime development banking from commercial banking, granting the institution the capacity to adopt longer-term asset structures and earnings-based risk assessment procedures that are not permissible under standard banking laws. By the completion of Phase 3, the maritime development bank would have built a lending capacity of INR 1 lakh crore and secured an AA domestic credit rating, enabling independent capital market access, and reduced the average cost of maritime financing to 5 to 6 percent, placing India on par with globally competitive rates.

Negotiating CIRR-Equivalent Bilateral Arrangements: The Ministry of External Affairs must negotiate bilateral financing arrangements with multilateral development banks (the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) and bilateral export credit agencies (South Korea, Japan, and China) to enable CIRR-equivalent rates of 4–5 percent on important maritime infrastructure and fleet expansion projects. Such arrangements require protracted treaty negotiations and sovereign guarantee schemes within India’s fiscal space. A successful Phase 1 and 2 implementation will make India credible as a bilateral partner, as its technical maritime financing capabilities will be demonstrated, as well as its institutional capacity to effectively deploy large-scale concessional loans. Successful bilateral agreements would result in concessional finance guarantees for major projects like advanced shipbuilding clusters and ultra-large ship acquisitions. Thus, marine development priorities must be incorporated into India’s international collaboration framework.

Conclusion

The magnitude of financing needed in the maritime sector is huge, but not out of proportion to India’s growth trajectory. Government projections show that the sector will need investments of about US$885 to US$940 billion by 2047.^[44] Spread over a 23-year period, this translates to an average capital deployment of about US$38–41 billion a year, equivalent to about 0.9 to 1 percent of India’s current Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The challenge is not the availability of capital in aggregate but the absence of institutional mechanisms capable of mobilising and deploying it at the required scale and tenor. The three-phase reform road map proposed in this brief deals with this directly: a maritime guarantee fund and refurbished SMFCL will make it possible to finance at 7–8 percent by 2030; integrated financing systems and freight taxes incomes will reach 6–7 percent by 2035; a unified maritime development bank and bilateral cooperation will provide financing at rates equal to international rates (5–6 percent) by 2047.

This reformed finance architecture must also be aligned with a definite answer to what vessel segments India should prioritise. Competing with China, which has over 74 percent^[45] share of global shipbuilding output, or Japan and South Korea in high-volume bulk carriers and large container ships, is not viable in the short term, given India’s cost structure and scale limitations. India’s competitive edge lies in specialised mid-sized vessel segments in which East Asian yards are not as prominent and where domestic demand offers a stable order base.^[46] These include chemical tankers, as evidenced by the SDHI order, offshore support vessels for India’s growing oil and gas sector, dredgers for port and waterway infrastructure development, and green fuel-ready vessels in line with IMO 2050 decarbonisation requirements. The financial assistance tiers within SBFAS already offer more incentives for specialised and green vessels. The institutional reforms proposed in this brief, specifically in the context of the priority criteria of the Maritime Guarantee Fund and the pilot financing structures under Phase 2, should also be designed with these segments explicitly in mind, which will enable India to build order flow, develop technical depth, and build commercial credibility in niche categories before competing in higher volume commodity vessel classes.

If implemented successfully, the institutional changes suggested in this paper will draw in INR 80 lakh crore in maritime investment, modernise the ageing Indian fleet, and raise domestic ship construction volume of 0.072 to 11.31 million GT annually. India will be on the path to being ranked among the top five maritime countries in the world with established financial infrastructures to match the lifecycle of the vessels and international standards.

Thus, institutional reform, rather than increased fiscal allocation, can transform marine financing fundamentals. India can achieve globally competitive pricing by concentrating expertise in specialised institutions, extending credit tenors to fit asset lifecycles, and mitigating risk through guarantee arrangements. This plan demonstrates that marine competitiveness is dependent on stronger institutional architecture, not bigger budgets.

Veer Puri is Research Assistant with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation.

All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Endnotes

^[1]Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2182563.

^[2] “Unlocking Shipbuilding Potential: From Pipe Dream to Possibility,” Maritime Gateway, February 2025, https://www.maritimegateway.com/unlocking-shipbuilding-potential-from-pipe-dream-to-possibility/.

^[3] Mahua Venkatesh, “Global Shipbuilders Invited to ‘Make in India’,” The Secretariat, 2025, https://thesecretariat.in/article/global-shipbuilders-invited-to-make-in-india.

^[4] Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2025/oct/doc20251014665901.pdf.

^[5] Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, Indian Shipping Statistics 2024, New Delhi: Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, 2024, https://shipmin.gov.in/sites/default/files/ISS%20Final%202024.pdf.

^[6] Directorate General of Maritime Administration, Government of India, “Ship Building and Repair: Catalyst for Economic Growth” (address, INMEX SMM India, Mumbai, 8–10 September 2025), Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways.

^[7] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2098573.

^[8] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2170573.

^[9] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=69044.

^[10] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2151554.

^[11] Dipak K. Dash, “Modi Unveils ₹70,000-cr Plan to Put India Among Top Shipbuilding Nations,” Economic Times, September 20, 2025, https://infra.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ports-shipping/india-launches-70000-crore-initiative-to-become-global-shipbuilding-leader/124026346.

^[12] Rahul Kapoor and Fotios Katsoulas, “Shipbuilding: Will India Seize the Global Opportunity?” S&P Global, September 17, 2025, https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/special-reports/india-forward/shifting-horizons/shipbuilding-will-india-seize-global-opportunity.

^[13] Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs, “China Dominates the Shipbuilding Industry,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 25, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-dominates-shipbuilding-industry.

^[14] “The Missing Link: Rethinking Ship Finance and Leasing,” Maritime Gateway, 2025, https://www.maritimegateway.com/the-missing-link-rethinking-ship-finance-and-leasing/.

^[15] Sujit Kumar, “Bridging the Maritime Infrastructure Financing Gap: The Role of Development Finance Institutions in India’s Blue Economy,” ETInfra.com, October 11, 2025, https://infra.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ports-shipping/development-finance-institutions-in-indias-maritime-sector/124470363.

^[16] “The Missing Link: Rethinking Ship Finance and Leasing.”

^[17] “The Missing Link: Rethinking Ship Finance and Leasing.”

^[18] “Norwegian Export Credit Guarantee Agency (GIEK),” International Institute for Sustainable Development, https://www.iisd.org/credit-enhancement-instruments/institution/norwegian-export-credit-guarantee-agency-giek/.

^[19] Export-Import Bank of Korea, We Finance Global Korea: Annual Report 2022, 2023, https://www.tradefinanceglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/KOREA-EXIM-BANK-2022-Annual-Report.pdf.

^[20] “Merchant Marine Fund Approves Investment of R$5.6 Billion for Brazil’s Naval Sector,” DatamarNews, March 26, 2020, https://datamarnews.com/noticias/merchant-marine-fund-approves-investment-of-r5-6-billion-for-brazils-naval-sector/.

^[21] Export Finance Norway, “General Terms and Conditions,” Eksfin, https://www.eksfin.no/en/application-process/terms/.

^[22] International Institute for Sustainable Development, “Norwegian Export Credit Guarantee Agency (GIEK),” https://www.iisd.org/credit-enhancement-instruments/institution/norwegian-export-credit-guarantee-agency-giek/.

^[23] International Institute for Sustainable Development, “Norwegian Export Credit Guarantee Agency (GIEK).”

^[24] Export Finance Norway, “Ship Financing,” Eksfin, https://www.eksfin.no/en/products/ship-financing/.

^[25] Export Finance Norway, “Interest and Premium Rates,” Eksfin, https://www.eksfin.no/en/interest/.

^[26] Government of Norway, The Government’s Action Plan for Green Shipping (Oslo: Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2019), 7, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/Air%20pollution/The%20Governments%20action%20plan%20for%20green%20shipping.pdf.

^[27] “Fitch Affirms Export-Import Bank of Korea at ‘AA-‘; Outlook Stable,” Fitch Ratings, October 29, 2025, https://www.fitchratings.com/research/banks/fitch-affirms-export-import-bank-of-korea-at-aa-outlook-stable-29-10-2025.

^[28] Export-Import Bank of Korea, “Joint Opportunities with KEXIM – A Brief Guide to KEXIM Maritime Financing Programs,” June 8, 2016, https://www.iobe.gr/docs/pub/SP_08062016_PRS_ENG_13.pdf.

^[29] Export-Import Bank of Korea, We Finance Global Korea: Annual Report 2022.

^[30] Export-Import Bank of Korea, We Finance Global Korea: Annual Report 2022.

^[31] “Fitch Affirms Export-Import Bank of Korea at ‘AA-‘; Outlook Stable.”

^[32] “Merchant Marine Fund Approves Investment of R$5.6 Billion for Brazil’s Naval Sector,” DatamarNews, March 26, 2020, https://datamarnews.com/noticias/merchant-marine-fund-approves-investment-of-r5-6-billion-for-brazils-naval-sector/.

^[33] “Merchant Marine Fund Approves Investment of R$5.6 Billion for Brazil’s Naval Sector.”

^[34] Government of Brazil, “Naval Sector Closes 2024 with Authorized Investments of BRL 31 Billion, Largest Amount in 12 Years,” Gov.br, January 10, 2025, https://www.gov.br/se/en/latest-news/2025/01/naval-sector-closes-2024.

^[35] “Naval Sector Closes 2024 with Authorized Investments of BRL 31 Billion, Largest Amount in 12 Years.”

^[36] Swan Defence and Heavy Industries Limited, “SDHI Signs Letter of Intent with European Ship Owner Rederiet Stenersen AS for Construction of Six 18,000 DWT Chemical Tankers,” November 10, 2025, https://sdhi.co.in/pdf/PressRelease-SDHISignsLetterofIntentwithEuropeanShipOwnerRederietStenersenASforConstructionofSix18000DWTChemicalTankers10Nov.pdf.

^[37] P. Manoj, “Exclusion of Chemical Tankers from List of Specialised Vessels for State Aid to Hurt Local Yards,” Economic Times, January 3, 2026, https://infra.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ports-shipping/exclusion-of-chemical-tankers-from-state-aid-hurts-local-shipyards-and-contracts/126318445.

^[38] Swan Defence and Heavy Industries Limited, “SDHI Signs Letter of Intent with Rederiet Stenersen AS.”

^[39] Export Finance Norway, “General Terms and Conditions.”

^[40] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2139902.

^[41] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2139902.

^[42] “Merchant Marine Fund Approves Investment of R$5.6 Billion for Brazil’s Naval Sector.”

^[43] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2150371.

^[44] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2182563.

^[45] Katherine Si, “Chinese Shipyards Booked 74% of All Newbuilding Orders in 2024,” Seatrade Maritime News, January 17, 2025, https://www.olgn.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/11.Seatrade-Chinese-shipyards-booked-74-percent-of-all-newbuilding-orders-in-2024.pdf.

^[46] Kapoor and Katsoulas, “Shipbuilding: Will India Seize the Global Opportunity?”

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