In this paper, we explore the relationship between the personal characteristics of finance ministers and the level of government debt, aiming to unravel the critical role of capable financial leadership in fostering fiscal discipline. We posit that the appointment of a competent finance minister is pivotal in driving fiscal policy reforms, enhancing measures to enforce tax compliance, and promoting transparency in public debt management. To answer this question, we construct a new comprehensive dataset encompassing details on the education, professional background, gender, and political affiliation of finance ministers across 23 African countries from 1980 to 2020. Our findings reveal compelling insights, notably demonstrating a statistically significant reduction in debt-to-GDP ratios when the finance minister is female. While causation cannot be unequivocally asserted, our results align with the hypothesis that the personal attributes of leaders, specifically finance ministers in our study, wield a substantial influence on critical macroeconomic indicators such as government debt.
Hence, our paper constitutes an essential contribution to the expanding literature investigating the influence of leaders’ characteristics on economic outcomes. Noteworthy precedents include Jones and Olken (2005), whose work underscores the essential role of leaders in shaping a country’s growth prospects, and Besley et al. (2011), revealing a positive correlation between leaders’ higher education levels and economic growth. Dreher (2009) further contributes by emphasizing the significance of leaders’ professional experiences, highlighting that leaders with backgrounds as entrepreneurs or trained economists exhibit a greater inclination toward reform-oriented policies. In alignment with this narrative, Mishra and Reshef (2019) ascertain that central bank governors with financial sector experience are three times more likely to deregulate. Despite these insightful contributions, the exploration of finance ministers’ personal characteristics remains relatively scant. Consistent with our research inquiry, Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014) find that, among German finance ministers, only professional backgrounds wield an impact on budget deficits. Similarly, Moessinger (2014) corroborates this notion, finding that the effect of finance ministers in 15 European countries on debt-to-GDP ratios is contingent primarily upon their professional backgrounds.
Our paper makes significant contributions to this domain through various avenues. Firstly, we construct a unique dataset detailing the personal characteristics of finance ministers specifically tailored to the African context. This unique dataset serves as a valuable resource for gaining insights into the nuanced landscape of financial leadership in Africa. Secondly, leveraging this dataset, we ask the following questions: How do the personal characteristics of African finance ministers influence debt-to-GDP ratios? If yes, which of these characteristics are particularly pertinent and distinct to the African context? Additionally, we seek to unravel the underlying mechanisms through which these variables exert their influence on government debt. Notably, our findings highlight that the tenure of finance ministers yields a statistically significant impact on debt-to-GDP ratios, offering a concrete example of the distinctive insights our research provides.
Thirdly, we contend that Africa serves as an especially compelling case for scrutinizing the personal characteristics of leaders, for two key reasons. Firstly, despite commendable strides toward democratization in many African nations, the continent still exhibits the highest concentration of dictatorships globally. As of 2020, Freedom House reported a total of 52 dictatorships worldwide, with 22 of them located in Africa. Secondly, notwithstanding the democratic transition, African institutions remain weak relative to the rest of the world. Notably, executive authority in Africa wields substantial political power, allowing for potential interference in both fiscal and monetary policy (Masaki, 2018). To accommodate this nuanced context, our analysis explores the impact of political affiliation on government debt. Specifically, we meticulously gather data on the political affiliations of finance ministers and heads of state. Subsequently, we rigorously test whether finance ministers belonging to the same political party as the head of the executive branch exert any discernible influence on debt-to-GDP ratios. Intriguingly, our results reveal that the political affiliation of finance ministers, in this particular context, has no significant impact on government debt.
Finally, our dataset encompasses comprehensive details on the personal characteristics of the heads of state across the 23 African countries under scrutiny. Consequently, we integrate the personal characteristics of finance ministers with those of the heads of state. Importantly, our key findings withstand the inclusion of these additional variables, attesting to the robustness and consistency of our results and underscoring the enduring impact of finance ministers’ personal attributes on government debt, independent of the characteristics of heads of state.
Interestingly, our findings deviate from the previous literature, which generally associates newly appointed ministers with a positive and statistically significant surge in government debt. Contrary to this trend, our analysis reveals a counterintuitive effect—newly appointed ministers are correlated with a decrease in government debt. Intriguingly, this effect diminishes over time, with a notable weakening in the ability of finance ministers to influence debt levels as their tenure lengthens. We posit that this phenomenon might be attributed to foreign education, hypothesizing that finance ministers educated abroad are more likely to enforce fiscal discipline. However, our results challenge this hypothesis, demonstrating that the origin of finance ministers’ education does not exert a significant impact on debt outcomes. Additionally, we explore the “revolving door” mechanism, suggesting that as finance ministers become more entrenched in the political landscape over time, they may prioritize personal gains over socially optimal outcomes, leading to the accommodation of the executive branch. Strikingly, our analysis finds no evidence supporting the idea that future professional experience influences government debt.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly discusses public debt in an African context, section 3 provides a discussion on the importance of finance ministers, and an overview of our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and our estimation method. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6, the robustness checks, section 7 discusses the mechanism, and section 8 concludes.
